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Introduction
Back in 1960 the demand at Greensboro, North Carolina,
was for a twenty cent harrburger at a downtown white-owned
lunch counter. Since then, freedom rides, sit-ins, marches .
for jobs, income and decent housing, and finally urban riots
have become vehicles for black expression against racism and
for a fair share of American affluence. The response of the
white corporate sector to such anguished calls for change has
been, in general, indifference, if not open hostility. Only
when the smoke from ghetto uprisings could be seen in their
suburbs did corporate management begin to realize that the
problems in the ghe,tto were potentially their problems as well.
In the absence of business support, the federal govern-
ment responded to the clamor for meaningful social change with
a portfolio of inadequately funded reforms. Beginning with
the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) in 1962, the
government concentrated its efforts on injecting job skills
into the poor so as to transform them into useful inputs for
the expanding business sector. The Johnson administration later
introduced an assortment of &dquo;Great Society&dquo; programs dealing
with health, education, housing, sanitation, and legal aid in
an attempt to broaden the attack on poverty. Typically,these
programs were designed to outfit &dquo;misfits&dquo; with the qualifica-
tions necessary for effective job competition in a newly
evolving supertechnological labor market.
Increasingly,it has become clear, however, that under _
the continued stress of Vietnam spending, the &dquo;Great Society&dquo;
war on poverty has been reduced to a skirmish, one that we are
hardly winning. And so it is, that while some progress has
no doubt been made through the Job Corps, the Neighborhood
Youth Corps, and programs with the soaring aspirations of
Upward Bound and Vista, the fact remains that the ghetto sur-
vives rooted to the inner city soil very much as it was before
the days of the New Frontier. At one time or another, some
minority of American minorities may have been aided by these
inadequate schemes, but the economist’s logic cannot be denied:
the marginal benefits from poverty programs have been purchased
at high opportunity cost. Transferring the meager war on .
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poverty program funds directly to the poor in terms of income
supplements possibly would have yielded a higher benefit/cost
ratio in welfare terms.
Nevertheless, a new optimism is growing in some quarters,
for out of the rubble of incinerated ghettos has grown a fresh
perspective for liberating black America. The new plan, &dquo;black
economic self-determination,&dquo; entails black ownership, opera-
tion, an.d control of business enterprise. Ironically, this
scheme developed by black militants appears to have caught the
fancy of government officials on both sides of the aisle as
well as won the enthusiastic support of a previously disin-
terested corporate &dquo;elite.&dquo; Under the rubric of &dquo;black capi-
talism&dquo; -- a term coined by the mass media -- the illusion has
been generated that such diverse personages as Roy Innis of
CORE and Arjay Miller of Ford share the same political-economic
perspective. The fact behind the illusion, however, is that
&dquo;black economic self-determination&dquo; and &dquo;black capitalism&dquo; are
potentially very different games played under vastly different
rules. Indeed, one set of rules may portend a viable inner-
city political movement with some new jobs within an internally
controlled inner city economic base while the other may lead
to a few more jobs for the black community, but inevitably at
the expense of greater inner city subservience to the white
economic structure.
The Ghetto Economy . ,
According to recent estimates, blacks constitute over
11% of the population, yet own or operate less than 1% of thenation’s five million private businesses. Fewer than 3 1/2%
of the non-white labor force are managers, officials, or
proprietors, while 14.2% of white employment is found in such
occupations. And while one in forty whites is a proprietor
of some sort, only one in a thousand Negroes is so situated.
The distribution of business enterprises is, indeed, even
more dismal than these statistics imply, for an overwhelming
proportion of Negro-owned business is extremely small-scale
and marginal, lying at the periphery of the American economic
structure. It should come as no surprise, then, that the
black customer, even in his own neighborhood, inevitably faces
a white man when he buys his furniture, his clothing, or his
vegetables.
This condition has become, of course, increasingly in-
tolerable within the black community. Witness that in Watts,
in Detroit, in Newark, and in numerous other black communi-
ties, the first molotov cocktail targets were white-owned
storefronts, neon-lit symbols of a &dquo;honky&dquo;-dominated culture
and equally important, symbols of an entrenched lily-white
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economy. Even if the black customer got what he paid for in
the ghetto shop, the condition would remain intolerable, for
the seller-buyer relationship inside the ghetto remains a
white-black relationship with all its implicit status conno-
tations. Yet, even here it is clear from studies by Caplovitz
and others that the inner city poor pay more and get less than
the suburban rich.2 In this light, the ghetto black suffers
from living in a &dquo;company town&dquo; with a &dquo;company store&dquo; and
rarely accumulates enough to escape. Thus, with the routes
to the outside world blocked by segregated housing, low in-
comes, and often inadequate public transportation, black
leadership has turned inward to its own community to find the
means of escape. The evolving solution contains a detour
within the ghetto. 
’
’ 
The call has gone out to expropriate the company store
and develop it to meet the needs of the community, and not the
pocketbooks of absentee landlords and shopowners. The initial
demand calls fcr blacks to take over or buy out ghetto shops
and then not only manage them, but reap the profits that
might accrue from such enterprise. More far-reaching, how-
ever, is the expressed desire to expand the ghetto’s economic
base. For it is clear that while the expropriation of retail
shops, laundries, and small scale customer service industries
will place black faces behind the counters, the misery of low
incomes and constant subservience can never be overcome by
small-scale superficial means. Development of a production
as well as a distribution sector is necessary to generate a
viable economy.
Such a development, however, necessarily requires true-
mendous capital and expertise, two &dquo;commodities&dquo; which are
not native to the inner city and must be imported from White
America. For this reason, many black communities are turning
to the federal government and large-scale white enterprise
for aid. The response from Washington and especially from the
top men of the corporate sector, as we have indicated, has
been more than mildly enthusiastic.
The Need for Economic Development .
The real problem in the inner cities of America is not
white faces behind drugstore counters, a phenomenon only little
more than skin deep.3 Rather the root problem is the total
lack of income generating production, the obvious hallmark of
a poor community. For all practical purposes the inner city
is a devastated region, stifled for decades by a colonial rule
which systematically, if not with malevolent intent, deprived
its inhabitants of the physical and human capital needed for
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development. Denied the educational resources and the physical
infrastructure necessary to develop technical skills and pro-
vide an efficient means of production, while at the same time
denied access to the corporate sector through discriminatory
practices in housing, in the schools, on the job, and in the
capital market, the ghetto has been forced to rely upon its
one remaining resource: cheap labor. This it exports on de-
mand at a going rate of $1.60 an hour or less. During periods
of extremely high national aggregate demand, all but 10% of
such supply is bought; during periods of recession, as much .
as 40% is left to rot away. The ghetto is thus forced to sur-
vive on poverty wages, welfare payments, and anything it can
beg, borrow, or steal.
Such an economy, lacking its own means of production and
means of distribution, behaves as a sieve. Income injected
into the ghetto economy quickly dissipates into outlying sub-
urbs and outside investment. In economic terms, the inner
city has a very small multiplier, approaching the value of one.
Instead of remaining in the ghetto, passing from grocer to
baker to candlestick-maker in return for services or goods
supplied, the income dollar brought into the black community
in the morning, through a small payroll or welfare check,
gets spent that afternoon in a white-owned ghetto store, and
leaves in the evening for the suburbs and beyond. Such an
income cycle reduces considerably the real income of the
community and, what is worse, prevents the accumulation of
any meaningful savings which could be turned to investment.
The lack of indigenous black-owned enterprise thus accounts
in part for the continuing leakages of capital from the ghetto.
’ 
Indeed, the cycle described here need not necessarily
result in a depleted region. If the multiplier of an area
fails to rise much above one, but the region is productive,
exporting valuable goods and services to the outside world,
affluence is assured. This is the case of the white suburb.
But, of course, as we have indicated, the productive capacity
of the inner city lies undeveloped, exporting services lightly
valued by the corporate established market.
To’reverse this condition would require the development
of black-owned distribution centers in the form of wholesale
and retail outlets, the supply of consumer services, and most
importantly, the development of a black-owned and operated
production sector, capable of developing and manufacturing
goods for sale both internally and for export. In this manner,
injections of income into the inner city are greatly expanded
and the income multiplier is enhanced. While under present
circumstances, a great part of the gain from welfare checks
accrues to the white middle class, a developed inner city with
a production and distribution matrix would be in a position to
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When the Company was started, we did not have .
any business; but we were certain that we could
do more for Watts by putting a plant there than
by trying to absorb 500 Watts residents into our
regular work force at plants which were 20 and
30 miles away in a city which has inadequate
public transportation. 
&dquo;
After considerable effort, we obtained a contract .
for the construction of large hospital tents for
the military services. We invested a total of
$1.3 million in the project. More recently we
expanded our product lines to wood working and
metal work. Today, Watts Manufacturing Company
is a growing concern.
Our company’s experience leads me to conclude
that in order to establish meaningful business .
and industry in urban poverty areas, private
enterprise must go a bit beyond conventional
methods. Flexibility, I think, is the name of
the game we must play to be really successful
in the inner city today.
While Aerojet’s philanthropy created several hundred new
jobs in a riot-torn city thereby providing some marginal im-
provement in a post-marginal condition, it has done little to
reallign the relationship of the black community to the white
power structure. For the control of the Watts subsidiary does
not emanate from the ghetto; rather the &dquo;black&dquo; company re-
mains the child of Aerojet and it is to the father firm that
WMC, Inc. pays deference, and in the long-run, possibly profits.
Beyond direct corporate intervention in the ghetto are
concerted efforts to develop black corporations from within
the inner city. The most famous and successful of these ef-
forts remains the Opportunities Industrialization Center pro-
gram pioneered by the Rev. Leon H. Sullivan of Philadelphia.
In a recent interview, Dr. Sullivan related how he came to
establish the OIC and explained its progress.5
One Saturday night when I was thinking about this .
whole problem, I read about Jesus feeding 5,000
people with bread and fishes a little boy had
given Him. The miracle, you see, was in the
giving. So I decided that in my congregation we
could share our resources and create a financial
base on which to build housing and, ultimately,
business enterprises. ,
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Beginning with a quarter million dollars raised from his
church, Sullivan invested in a million dollar apartment com-
plex. Later &dquo;Progress Plaza,&dquo; the largest black-owned shopping
center in the world was established with 16 privately-owned
shops on 4 1/2 acres. Not content, Sullivan’s acquired business
sense directed him into the aerospace industry where he created
Progress Aerospace Enterprises with management borrowed from
the General Electric Corporation and a G.E. subcontract for
$2.5 million of component production for the U.S. moon mission.
In addition, Sullivan’s Zion Investment Corporation has estab-
lished the Progress Garmert Manufacturing Company in Philadelphia
which employs seventy-five workers. Management responsibility
of the Investment Corporation rests in a Board of Directors
selected by its 3,500 shareholders. The waiting list for stock
ownership is in excess of 2,000 families. Philadelphia has
over half a million Negroes. 
’
The Opportunities Industrialization Center program has
now spread to over 70 cities and $5 million has been raised
from the private sector to initiate local projects. Even
Puerto Rico, Kenya, Senegal and Nigeria are experimenting with
the OIC training program, a program aimed at creating skills
for use in private enterprise both in and outside the ghetto.
In the United States, the OIC National Industrial Advisory
Council, composed of 25 &dquo;influential&dquo; business leaders has
been created by Sullivan to help sell the program to corporate
heads who conceivably might give aid to newly developing black
business. George Champion, chairman of the board of the Chase
Manhattan Bank heads up the Advisory Council.
‘ 
In appraising the success of his brainchild, Sullivan
envisions a bright future for the Negro entrepreneur.
I see the African American becoming a part of
American capitalism -- in fact, joining the
free-enterprise system worldwide.
For all the years that my brothers and sisters-- 
-
and my poor ancestors -- have been a part of
America,we have been outside the door of free .
enterprise, outside the door of capitalism.
What I want to see is my black brothers walking
through the door of free enterprise, not as
&dquo;black capitalists&dquo; but as black men who can
join the who16 free-enterprise system and share 
.
its benefits.
The Reverend adds, . 
’
I think of myself and what I’m doing as &dquo;black 
’
power&dquo; itself -- it is black, it is capitalism, 
’
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it is American. I will never be satisfied until
every black adult in America owns a piece of this .
country individually or mutually, even if it is
no more than two square feet of earth or a share
of stock. 7
How evenly spread the benefits from Sullivan’s efforts
will be is yet to be seen. Whether capitalism can work for
the Negro working-class as well as the bourgeousie remains a
moot point. Nevertheless, it appears evident that the OIC
program has gained the support of white business and thus the
scarce resources of capital and technical expertise seem
assured at least in the short-run. But inherent in such a
strategy lingers the potential for external domination and
control by an &dquo;amiable&dquo; white power structure. And thus how
much of the black community can escape poverty and powerless-
ness in this way cannot be exactly determined, but surely the
rosy beginning need not point ineluctibly to a rosy future.
Yet a fourth strategy is now being developed by a small
group of black businessmen, economists, and accountants in
Detroit. The Inner City Business Improvement Forum (ICBIF)
was established immediately after the 1967 Detroit riot.8
With an inventory showing less than 35% of the ghetto economic
base owned by blacks, and a $50,000 gift &dquo;bribed&dquo; from Henry
Ford II, ICBIF set out to build a black infrastructure within
the inner city to stem the outward flow of black-earned dol-
lars. Over the past eighteen months ICBIF’s leadership has
evolved a &dquo;community concept of comprehensive inner city de-
velopment&dquo; which stresses the need to develop not only retail
outlets controlled by the black community, but the absolute
necessity of establishing a production sector and black bank-
ing system to accumulate internally generated investment
funds. Shying away from the paternalistic New Detroit Com-
mittee, created even before the 1967 conflagration cooled,
ICBIF has turned to individual white investors and increasingly
to the government for seed capital. In 1968 &dquo;Our&dquo; Supermarket
was established on Detroit’s East side to serve a large part
of the surrounding black community. ICBIF provided 10% of the
funds, while a leading city bank and the Small Business Admin-
istration picked up the first and second mortgages to supply
the rest of the initial capital outlay. Now one-dollar shares
are being sold in the community so as to assure that profit
from the supermarket goes to the community consumer rather .’
than suburban interests. The board of directors for this
supermarket and similar ventures created by ICBIF is chosen
by the &dquo;block&dquo; clubs in the serviced area. This, along with
a strict limit on an individual’s stockholdings, ensures
democratic control of each enterprise.
’ 
ICBIF has also aided traditional black retail businesses,
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supplying them with technical aid and seed capital in some
cases. Unlike the major enterprises of ICBIF, these are left
in private control along the lines of &dquo;corner store&dquo; black
capitalism. With a combination of community owned and
operated supermarkets and privately owned and operated small
scale retail shops, the black community in Detroit is begin-
ning to gain some control over the estimated $750 million
worth of consumer dollars which annually pass over inner city
store counters.
ICBIF’s comprehensive development scheme has already
transcended its humble beginning, Between July and December,
1968, $850,000 was committed to ICBIF which was used to es-
tablish a dozen new black business enterprises ranging from
privately controlled clothing stores to a small community
controlled iron foundry which supplies parts to the auto in-
dustry. On the drawing boards is the First Black National .
Bank of Detroit, several multimillion dollar shopping centers
in the ghetto, and several metal stamping and plastics plants.
Along with this program of business development, ICBIF is
initiating or already has spawned the following projects:
_ 
- A practical training program for black business
management .
- A computerized accounting center to aid new
black businesses in their bookkeeping
- An ICBIF Research Division which studies, among
other things, the business profile of the black
community and the potential for new enterprise
- A management consultant bureau which makes
available lawyers, accountants, production 
_




- A black better business bureau where consumers ’
can go to complain about both white and black
unfair business practices.
Evidence from ICBIF’s first year and a half of operation,
Detroit appears to possess the potential for developing a semi-
autonomous viable inner city economy, one which could provide
thousands of jobs and a large number of investment outlets.
Aided initially by white business, fearing the chaos of the
black ghetto, the plan envisioned by ICBIF foresees a cutting
of the umbilical cord to the white community. Free of external
manipulation, black control is gained over an independent
economic structure which can interact with the white-controlled
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economy from a position of comparative advantage rather than
subservience. But whether even this scale of independent 
’
black enterprise is sufficient for economic viability, free
of white support, is questionable.
To complete a typology of black business strategies, we
should add those schemes which are avowedly political and only
secondarily economic in nature. The economic development
strategy, in essence, is no more than an organizational tool
for building an indigenous inner city political base. By
investing small amounts of capital, either generated in-
ternally or &dquo;hustled&dquo; from guilt-ridden whites, a nascent
community-controlled black economic sector is launched, pro-
viding some new employment opportunities, but more importantly,
a rallying point for community action. Profits from the
enterprise are plowed back into the organization both for
further business expansion and for political action. In this
manner, the community organization becomes self-sufficient
and free from external control. As the economic substructure
expands, the political organization matures, benefitting from
a well-financed base. Educational and cultural activities can
be added to the political thrust of such a movement, thus
creating an integrated program of community action.
By now it should be patently clear that each of the
strategies outlined above can be evaluated upon two potentially
conflicting criteria: first, the speed with which the plan
leads to economic development as measured by rising employ-
ment, incomes, and capital outlay; and second, whether the
scheme possesses a structure and dynamic conducive to eco-
nomic and political liberation as measured by economic self-
sufficiency and political influence. The conflict between the
pace of development and self-determination arises from the
scarcity of capital and expertise in the ghetto. For the
inner city community to develop economically over a short
period of time, much capital and talent must be imported from
the white community. Inevitably, large-scale importation
leads to surrendering some control over the direction of 
.
development. ,
Thus,while one scheme leads rapidly to investment in _
the ghetto by white business, it almost assuredly fails to 
’
promise radical change in the structure of power relations
between white and black. On the other hand, development
carried on solely by the black community may contribute some
political freedom, but at the cost of continued economic
stagnation. A conscious decision must then be made by the 
’
black community as to which road it chooses to travel, and
indeed, how much &dquo;liberty&dquo; should be surrendered to hasten .
the development process. For the black community, to have
their cake and eat it too will seldom be a permissible choice.
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If black capitalism work, the hope is that the black community
will turn inward toward constricting a new set of economic con-
ditions within the inner city rather than turning outward with
attempts at reconstructing the conditions of power within the
white business community. And while, at present rates, wel-
fare checks designed to dminish dissidence portend an ever
expanding social expense and the training of blacks for white
corporations appears at best a long-run ameliorative device,
black capitalism seems to offer some relief from the immediate
chaos, if not from its causes. ,
Increasingly management also realizes that its own
autonomy can be better preserved and long-run profits augmented
by reducing the role of the federal government in developing
the ghetto. By forging an alliance between black capitalists
and themselves and foreclosing a nascent government-black
producer coalition, the corporate elite can look forward to
lower input costs (in terms of intermediate goods used by
large-scale industry in final goods production) and can spare
themselves future competition both for government contracts
and in the manufacture of some products. At the same time,
such an alliance may appear to corporate management as a de-
fense against &dquo;creeping socialism,&dquo; a specter which still
haunts the paranoid. Furthermore, a smaller federal role in
poverty programs and a larger corporate role in developing ,
all black subsidiaries in the inner city could lead to a re-
duced emphasis on legislation aimed at discriminatory policies
within the corporate sector. Legislation which now prohibits
the federal government from contracting with firms which fail
to live up to fair practice codes might be enforced less
stringently. Finally, the public relations boost derived
from lending a helping hand to the poor as well as the tax
saving from discontinued Great Society programs are viewed as
boons to big business.
In understanding the corporate manager’s positive atti-
tude toward black ghetto enterprise, one must realize that
corporate profits will not be endangered by the introduction
of the black capitalism stretegy envisioned by the corporate
establishment. The reason is simple: This strategy foresees
the black community providing only two generalized products:
(1) Retail services to fill the community’s need for vege-
tables, meats, drugstore products, and television repair, etc.,
and (2) Small-scale manufacture of intermediate goods used in
the industrial sector to produce automobiles, washing machines, ,
and computers. In the first case, the corporate sector is
left unharmed by black capitalism because the corporate sector
sells very little at the retail level and when it does, it
usually does not do it in the ghetto. The squeeze here will
be on the small-time white shopkeeper; the corner grocer and
the local repair shop owner.
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Ghetto manufacturing firms, examples of the second case,
will not only fail to deplete corporate profits, but actually
will contribute to them. It is for this reason that corpora-
tions like Aerojet have spread their &dquo;philanthropy&dquo; into the
ghetto. Excess profits of the largest industrial giants can
be invested in the inner city (without fear of retaliation
from the government anti-trust division) to establish subsidi-
aries which provide them with cheap parts and labor hired at
less than union scale. With the business perspective of &dquo;the
poverty problem is a technical problem,··10 corporate enterprise
efficiency experts can provide the cost-benefit analyses neces-
sary to ensure profitable gain from inner city firms. For
example:
It has been estimated that approximately sixty percent of
the value of an American automobile is not produced by the Big
Three. Rather this value is due to the literally scores of
thousands of parts vendors which manufacture everything from a
carburetor screw to a convertible top frame aid sell them to
automobile producers. In other large-scale industry, the 
’
value-added by parts suppliers is likely to be as high.
Obviously, then, big business is dependent on small-scale
enterprise for a large percentage of its profit. If the
price of parts is reduced, the profit of the car manufacturer
(or the electrical equipment firm or the television set pro-
ducer, etc.) can be raised with comparative ease.
Somewhere between 75-90% of the parts vendors for the
largest producing corporations are union shops. In many cases,
the wage rate paid in such small plants is comparable to that
paid in the leading industries. The auto companies, therefore,
must pay indirectly the higher union wage of the carburetor-
screw machine operator; and this, of course, becomes part of
the cost of producing a car. If this wage could be reduced,
the cost of the carburetor is cut; and thus the cost of pro-
ducing an automobile is lower, and GM, Ford, and Chrysler
make a higher profit. Multiply this by 60% of the final value
of American automobiles, and the total potential profit gain
is no doubt tremendous. Stockholders will be made happy and
so will corporate management.
Sidestepping unions in the already organized parts sup-
ply industry is a difficult, if not risky practice. Since the
1950’s, such attempts have been rare by large corporations.
But now the opportunity for circumventing union power by means
of coalition with the federal government and the black com-
munity has emerged. The small plant can pay half the going
wage of the unionized vendor operation thereby ensuring a
competitive edge over union plants, and yet still pay above
the wage scale normally offered low-skilled workers in the
ghetto. In this way both the ghetto and the corporation
benefit. Such a symbiotic relationship between the corporate
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elite and the community poor at the expense of the unionized
workingclass has the potential for evolving as the most exotic
in a long line of techniques aimed at curbing union strength.
Ford hired blacks to break unions in the twenties and now Ford
has a better idea. It, like other modern corporations, has
found a new, almost socially acceptable way to do the same
thing in the sixties and seventies. Little wonder the AFL-
CIO has vigorously attacked all black capitalism plans.
Other strategies utilizing black capitalism to produce
higher white corporate profit show equal ingenuity. For
example, during the short-lived period of five-year/50,000
mile automobile warranties, auto industry executives developed
a scheme whereby pre-delivery automobile diagnostic centers
would be established in the ghetto, using black labor and
white corporate capital and expertise. Such black-owned
centers, manned by trained black auto mechanics, would test
new cars at company expense before delivery to their prospec-
tive buyers. In this way fewer repairs would be required at
cost to the auto industry and customer satisfaction would be
reinforced. However, before the diagnostic centers were
financed, the shorter car warranty was reinstated by the
industry. Now the auto firm is no longer responsible for
repairing much of its built-in obsolescence, and consequently
the industry’s savings from pre-delivery diagnosis and ad-
justment is reduced. The upshot is that the auto executives’
enthusiasm for the centers has waned considerably and the
project lies on the scrap heap.
Last, but not least, mention must be made again of the
profits which can be gleaned from government subsidy programs
designed to induce big business participation in inner city
development. With such subsidies or tax incentives as speci-
fied in the Community Self-Determination Bill, for example,
little effort is required on behalf of the corporate structure
to create a &dquo;ghetto-industrial&dquo; complex including cost-plus
contracts and the profits they imply. We may not be very far
off in concluding that it appears the corporate establishment
is more than happy to help the black community -- especially
if it gets a little helping itself!
&dquo;Black Capital ism&dquo; Reconsidered 
&dquo;
’ 
Business brought into the ghetto by the white corporate
establishment may very well add something to the inner city
environment. Some new jobs will be created, the average wage
in the core city may rise a bit, and a few enterprising
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But what is equally true is that no black capitalism scheme ..~
which relies on the white establishment for sustenance will 
&dquo;&dquo;
lead to a form of inner city economic development which in .
turn can lead to black socio-political liberation. To put it
plainly, it is not in the interest of big business to develop
a viable black economic sector, competitive in the newly
evolving growth industries. At best the black community will
vie with the blue collar union sector for a share of the inter-
mediate goods market.
But if corporate intervention in the inner city will not
create a viable economy, can independent private black capi-
tans, unaided, but also unemcumbered by the mixed blessing of
corporate involvement, lead the black community to freedom? 
’
The answer is probably no. Independent private black enter-
prise cannot serve as the catalyst for economic development
and political power.
It is a sad fact that private small-scale enterprise pays
extremely low wages, reaps little profit for its owner, and
consequently contributes little to economic development per
se. While black retail capitalism will boost the inner city
multiplier by some small amount, the additional income thus
generated will fail to raise a significant number from poverty.
Consider, for instance, the average hourly wage rates paid inretail trade across the nation in the mid-1960’s:l
Limited price variety stores $1.31
Eating and drinking places 1.14
Drug and proprietory stores 1.56
Gasoline service stations 1.52
Apparel and accessory stores 1.70
Retail food stores 1.91
These were average rates; the inner city wage levels helped to
keep them this low. In addition statistics on low-wage indus-
try profits show that there is little room to raise these wage
rates much beyond such low levels.12 All of this is due to
the high degree of business competition in the retail field,
which subjects the small-scale firm to a profit and wage
squeeze. Add to this the additional costs which small-scale
business in the inner city must bear because of higher in- .
surance costs, uninsured losses due to crime, and the higher
cost of inner city transportation, and the picture of low wages
and low profits comes sharply into focus. Hence, while the
sight of black faces behind ghetto drugstore counters may be
comforting psychologically, it is not economically.
A small private production sector will also fail to add
much viability to the inner city economy. In the first place
it is highly unlikely that individuals from the black community
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will have the ability to raise sufficient capital, independent
of white business and government, to initiate enterprise
especially in the fastest growing sectors of the economy:
electronics, computers, automation equipment design, etc.
To be successful in these industries requires enough capital
to keep pace with rapid technological change. In addition
the efficient size of manufacturing firms is usually beyond
the capacity of ghetto residents with their present inadequate
resources. Finally, even if the capital could be raised to
develop one or two competitive production centers, the marginal
addition to the welfare of a ghetto the size of Detroit’s,
Chicago’s, New York’s, Los Angeles’, or even Cleveland’s would
be insignificant in terms of producing a catalyst for full-
scale economic development.
The result, inevitably, of black entrepreneur capitalism
is not the creation of an inner city economic infrastructure,
but the development of a larger black bourgeoisie, which ,
given rising income, will quickly emigrate from the ghetto
taking along both a large part of the wage bill and all of
the profit. The tendency toward a black class society is
thereby reinforced, with continued low wages and welfare pro-
grams in the inner city and a richer, only slightly more
numerous, black middle class community on the outside. Again
income will flow outward in great quantity, leaving the bulk
of the ghetto residents no better off, save for a few more
low-wage jobs and a few more black faces across the drugstore
counter. Profits are reaped by an enlarged black middle class,
while the losses continue to be borne by the poor.
An Alternative...
Even if blessed with normal profits, black privately
owned enterprise will fail in the relevant future to aggregate
the capital necessary for the creation of a viable inner city
economy. Because of the large capital input necessary to
initiate a community-wide enterprise, the tendency under _
black private ownership will be to buy up over time scattered
small-scale enterprises rather than accumulate the necessary
capital for large-scale high profit investment. In this way
independent private black capitalism is doomed to corner store
capitalism; inefficient, non-competitive, low-wage, and low
profit. There is slim chance that such a beginning can pro-
duce the savings for reinvestment and development.
The alternative to both white dominated ghetto inter-
vention and small-scale private black capitalism is community-
owned enterprise. Inner city residents can pool both the
capital they own and that which can be bribed from the govern-
ment or other sources on a &dquo;no-strings&dquo; basis, and under
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democratic rule, invest in cooperative industry on a relatively
large scale. Supermarkets, department Stores, banks, and in-,
termediate-size factories can then be the first order of
business -- not corner drugstores. Creating business centers
which are relatively crime-proof compared to sidewalk shops,
taking full advantage of scale economies, and aggregating
profits will ensure lower costs and larger reinvestment po-
tential. As the black community &dquo;owns&dquo; the industry, the
wages and dividends from such enterprise remain within the
inner city. Those who choose to leave the ghetto should not
be allowed to take more capital out of the community than the
small amount they originally contributed (with some interest)
nor should they be permitted to take part of the wage bill
with them. As long as there remains unemployment in the inner
city, residents who choose to emigrate must relinquish the
jobs they hold in community enterprise. Escape from the
ghetto remains open, but not at the expense of the majority
of the ghetto community. In order to maximize reinvestment
so as to build as ,viable and diversified an inner city economy
as possible, leakages of capital and income must be kept to
a minimum. Community ownership and control ensures that the
route from poverty is provided the entire black underclass,
not merely a chosen few. Furthermore, if a good part of black
community development is to be financed by federal funds --
through low-interest loans or seed grants -- justice is only
done if the whole community benefits and not merely a rela-
tively small number of private entrepreneurs. Both on effi-
ciency and equity grounds, then, black cooperative enterprise
is preferable to &dquo;traditional&dquo; corner store capitalism.
... And A Realistic Perspective
Here we must add a word of caution. Despite grandiose
plans and even federal support, the black community should not
be hoodwinked by either the corporate establishment nor many
of its own ebullient leaders into believing that &dquo;black
capitalism&dquo; in any of its forms including black &dquo;socialism&dquo;
can automatically lead to economic and political freedom.
For no matter how important a goal, black economic self-
determination will ultimately be largely an illusion. To be
sure, hundreds, possibly even thousands of jobs will be created
and many businesses may end up under black control; but in the
final analysis, the market will determine which businesses
succeed and which fail. Unlike the textbook model, the American
market, manipulated in good part by the already existing cor-
porate structure, allows few new small independent enterprises
to reach the strata of &dquo;big business.&dquo; The inner city, starved
for capital and expertise -- even with federal aid -- begins
far back in the field of potential money-winners. Thus .
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mythologizing about the possibility of the black community
creating through its own industry the route to equal affluence
will be in vain or worse, a practice conducive to self-
destructive frustration. In the context that the coal of
economic development is the answer er se, the trap of &dquo;black
capitalism&dquo; is laid.
Yet there exists another context in which to place black
economic self-determination, and it is in this context that we
find the genius of the black economic development strategy.
While the creation of a black economy in the ghetto may not
lead inexorably to a viable economic base -- competitive with
the staunchest of &dquo;white&dquo; enterprise -- the act of striving
toward an inner city economy yields a powerful tool for or-
ganizing the black community into a coherent political force
capable of extracting concessions on jobs, housing, income,
and dignity from the government and from the corporate estab-
lishment. While &dquo;black socialism&dquo; alone may not be capable
of rooting out poverty, it may root out powerlessness and thus
gain for the black community the indirect means to freedom
from poverty and the manifestations of racism. In the striving
for economic independence, not only is dependence on the white
power structure for jobs and poverty incomes reduced, but the
economic incentive to coalesce within the black community
increases as well. Jobs and income are created within the ,
community and it is from such a base that political and social
power are born.
Black community enterprise will, in addition, have a
considerable impact on the whole economy, not because it can
successfully compete with white enterprise directly, but be-
cause income generated from community enterprise can be used
to develop well-financed political organization, capable of
confronting City Hall and Congress with a united front. If
in the past, the black movement has been stifled by a lack of
financial support, especially once it diverged from the strict
integrationist political line, the community movement will now
have a self-financed base. For while a large part of the
&dquo;profit&dquo; from black community enterprise can be reinvested in
expanded business projects, a part can also be earmarked
specifically for political activity.
Taken in this context, black community enterprise not
only places black faces behind drugstore counters, and allows
a moderate scale production sector, but more importantly, it
facilitates the creation of an indigenously financed, strictly
independent, political force within the ghetto. Unlike
&dquo;corner store&dquo; black capitalism which fails on two accounts:
(1) to create an economic infrastructure capable of pulling
the black community out of poverty, and (2) to create a mean-
ingful community controlled power base; and unlike corporate
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intervention in the ghetto which adds longevity to white eco-
nomic and political dominance over the black community, black
community enterprise, or what we have called &dquo;black socialism&dquo;
promises a new hope for political and social liberation.
While as a &dquo;goal,&dquo; the black economic development strate-
gy may be an utter failure in any of its forms, as a &dquo;means&dquo; 
°
one of its forms, &dquo;black socialism,&dquo; may be judged in the future
an unqualified success. The real question of black enterprise
then must not be whether it succeeds on the accountant’s balance
sheet, but whether it succeeds ultimately in the struggle to
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